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ADHERING TO LAW AND VALUES AGAINST TERRORISM
Mary Ellen O'Connell*
INTRODUCTION
The thesis of this article was inspired by the remarks of John 0.
Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism, at Harvard Law School on September 16, 2011. Brennan
said:
I've developed a profound appreciation for the role that our
values, especially the rule of law, play in keeping our country
safe. It's an appreciation, of course, understood by President
Obama.... That is what I want to talk about this evening-how
we have strengthened, and continue to strengthen, our national
security by adhering to our values and our laws.I
Brennan's position is backed up by considerable data and analysis from
counter-terrorism experts.2 If the United States adheres to its values and the
rule of law, security can be enhanced. He went on in the remainder of his talk
to attempt to defend the U.S. record of compliance with American values and
the rule of law. That record is poor; however, with respect to a number of
fundamental principles U.S. officials claim to be in compliance with the law
* Mary Ellen O'Connell holds the Robert and Marion Short Chair in Law and is Research
Professor of International Dispute Resolution-Kroc Institute for Peace Studies at the
University of Notre Dame. Her research is in the areas of international legal theory,
international law on the use of force, and international dispute resolution. She is the author or
editor of numerous books and articles on these subjects, including, WHAT IS WAR? AN
INVESTIGATION IN THE WAKE OF 9/11 (Martinus Nijhof/Brill, 2012) and THE POWER AND
PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
ENFORCEMENT (Oxford University Press 2011).
1 Remarks of John 0. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism, Strengthening our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws, Program
on Law and Security, Harvard Law School, Sept. 16, 2011, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-
strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an.
2 See generally David Cortright, et al., Friend, Not Foe: The Role of Civil Society in
Preventing Violent Extremism, 2 NOTRE DAME J. INT'L & COMP. L. 238 (2012); John Mueller,
How Dangerous are the Taliban? FOREIGN AFF., Apr. 15, 2009
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/64932; SETH G. JONES & MARTIN C LIBICKI, How
TERRORIST GROUPS END: LESSONS FOR COUNTERING AL QA'IDA (Rand Corp. 2008) available
at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RANDMG741-1.pdf; Mary Ellen O'Connell,
Enhancing the Status ofNon-State Actors Through a Global War on Terror, 43 COLUMBIA J.
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are too often referring to compliance with a mistaken, false, or distorted
version of the relevant rules.
The remainder of this article aims at demonstrating the claim of poor
U.S. compliance with the rule of law and the fundamental values the law seeks
to implement in the counterterrorism context. The first evidence of poor
compliance to be offered consists of a set of recommendations made to the
Obama transition team in 2008. The recommendations were a set of priorities
to get the United States into compliance with important international law
obligations. To date, only one of the eight has been fully implemented-the
principle aimed at ending the use of torture. The arguably more important
recommendation, to end the so-called "global war on terrorism" has not been
implemented. After reviewing what should have been done by the Obama
administration, the article will move on to indicate what has been done,
focusing on the use of the "global war" assertion to justify the targeted killing
of persons outside armed conflict zones. The final part of the article will
consider in some detail why the claim Brennan made at Harvard that the
administration is complying with the rule of law in its counter-terrorism policy
is inaccurate.
I. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RETURNING TO THE RULE OF LAW AGAINST
TERRORISM
In November 2008, about a week after the presidential election, Dean
Thomas J. Romig, a former Advocate General of the U.S. Army, organized a
conference called, "The Rule of Law and the Global War on Terrorism." The
final panel was titled, "The Way Forward" and featured David Graham, a long-
time Judge Advocate General in the U.S. Army and the Department Chair of
International Law at the Judge Advocate General School in Charlottesville,
Virginia; Philippe Sands, professor of law at University College, London, a
member of Matrix Chambers in the United Kingdom, and a prominent
practitioner who has appeared in high profile international law cases, such as
the litigation to extradite Augusto Pinochet to Spain; and the third member of
the panel, the author of this article, a professor of law at the University of
Notre Dame, who specializes in the international law on the use of force, was a
professional military educator for the U.S. Department of Defense in
Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany (1995-1998).
The panel, therefore, represented considerable expertise in international
law and the law on the use of force in particular. Its members agreed at the
conclusion of their remarks that there had been considerable agreement during
the two days of the conference by people of varying perspective from many
places around the globe.3 Following the conference the members of the final
3 The Way Forward-Legal Choices in the Global War on Terror, The Rules of Law and
the Global War on Terror: Detainees, Interrogation and Military Commissions, Washburn
University, School of Law, Topeka, Kansas, Nov. 13-14, 2008, available at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2008/11 /way-forward-post-91 1-principles.php.
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panel drafted a set of eight principles that reflected their understanding of the
law and could guide the transition team of President Obama in leading the
United States back to compliance with fundamental international law in the
aftermath of the Bush administration's handling of the post-911 period:
Washburn Consensus on Post-9/11 Principles
1. The phrase "Global War on Terrorism" should no longer be
used in the sense of an on-going "war" or "armed conflict" being
waged against "terrorism." Nor should it serve as either the
legal or security policy basis for the range of counter- and anti-
terrorism measures taken by the Administration in addressing the
very real and present challenges faced by the United States and
other nations in addressing terrorism.
2. The Administration should announce that it is taking immediate
steps to close the interrogation and detention facility at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, with a view to removing all remaining
detainees by July 1, 2009.
3. The Military Commissions Act of 2006 should be repealed in its
entirety, and all activities currently being conducted under the
Military Commission process constituted by the Act should be
terminated.
4. Persons accused of committing acts of terrorism, war crimes or
other serious human rights violations should be tried, as
appropriate, before Article III courts or, as provided for in the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, by courts-martial or military
commission.
5. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 should be amended to
ensure the application of one standard of treatment and
interrogation to all detainees held in U.S. custody or control.
6. The single standard for the treatment and interrogation of all
detainees held in U.S. custody or control should be that reflected
in Army Field Manual 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector
Operations.
7. Any presidential findings, statements, Executive Orders, or
other forms of authorization related to detainee treatment and
interrogation that sanction or authorize methods inconsistent
with Field Manual 2-22.3 should be withdrawn.
8. A comprehensive investigation of alleged post-9/11 U.S.-held
detainee abuse should be undertaken by an independent, expert
commission with the goal of producing a 2009 report detailing
both the findings and recommendations of this commission.
291
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David E. Graham, Colonel (ret'd)
Executive Director, The Judge Advocate General's
Legal Center and School, U.S. Army
Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell
Robert and Marion Short Chair in Law
University of Notre Dame
Professor Philippe Sands QC
University College London
Barrister, Matrix Chambers
1. The Panel was chaired by Dean of the Washburn Law School
and former Judge Advocate General of the Army, Thomas J.
Romig
2. These views are expressed in Mr. Graham's private capacity. 4
Of the eight principles, only Principle Six has been fully implemented.
President Obama issued an executive order two days after he was inaugurated
that mandates the use of Army Field Manual 2-22.3." The executive order has
been followed up by law that forbids private contractors from carrying out
interrogation of person in United States custody or detention.6 It was,
apparently, contractors who water boarded Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 183
times and Abu Zubaydah eighty-three times.
Seven of the eight Washburn consensus principles have not been fully
implemented, including the first and arguably the most important principle:
ending the "global war on terrorism." President Obama himself criticized the
assertion that the United States was in a worldwide war against terrorism and
his administration does not use the phrase.8 While he said the United States
could not be at truly be at war with an abstract concept like terrorism, the real
problem with the "war on terrorism" is that the president uses the construct to
argue he has the legal authority to kill without warning and detain without trial
persons who are physically distant from any actual zone of armed conflict
hostilities. This position is inconsistent with international law, and, yet,
4 id.
See Executive Order 13491, Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, Jan. 22, 2009, 74 FED.
REG. 4893 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-01-27/pdf/E9-1885.pdf
6 See National Defense Implements Authorization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §
1038, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009).
7 See Scott Shane, Waterboarding Used 266 Times on 2 Suspects, Apr. 19, 2009, N.Y.
TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/20/world/20detain.html.
8 See Edward Luce & Daniel Dombey, Obama Junks "Global War on Terror" Label, FIN.
TIMES, June 30, 2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d4bdIbb6-64f7-11de-al3f-
00144feabdcO.html#axzz 1 utGNmkyU.
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President Obama continues to authorize killing and detention of persons far
from hostilities. True, the name was changed from the "global war on
terrorism" to the "armed conflict against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated
forces."9 The violations of international law, however, continue. In fact, with
respect to targeted killing, the record is worse.
II. The U.S. Practice of Targeted Killing of Terrorism Suspects
On the very day of the Notre Dame International Law Society
Symposium, September 30, 2011, just two weeks after Brennan's Harvard
speech, the United States fired missiles launched from drones and jet aircrafts
at two vehicles traveling in Yemen. Four persons were killed, including two
U.S. citizens, Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan.10 Two weeks later, the
United States fired more missiles in Yemen killing al-Awlaki's sixteen year
old son, seventeen year old nephew, and seven other persons." In this time
period, the United States also announced that it is building secret drone bases
in Africa and on the Arabian Peninsula so that the CIA and the U.S. military
may continue to carry out such targeted killing with the use of drones into the
future-presumably after the United States has ended its participation in
combat in Afghanistan and would be involved in no armed conflict hostilities.
These developments should be of grave concern to everyone everywhere of
good will.
The plans for continuing targeted killing unrelated to any armed
conflict hostilities represent a significant departure from the rule of law. The
more immediate issue, however, is the on-going actual killing of persons. The
Obama administration has carried out more than twice the number of targeted
killings of the Bush administration. For the first years of the Obama
administration, little was said about this fact. President Obama had
campaigned as an anti-war candidate, criticizing the Iraq War and the war on
terrorism. He promised to end the use of torture and promised to close the
infamous Guantinamo Bay prison. He went to Cairo and gave an inspiring
speech on human rights and democracy. He seemed interested in finally
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian impasse. He brought Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Samantha Power, Rosa Brooks, and Harold Koh into his administration-all
associated with international law or human rights. Brooks and Koh had been
9 Harold Hongju Koh, The Obama Administration and International Law, Annual Meeting
ASIL,Mar. 25, 2010, Washington, D.C., http://www.state.gov/s/1/releases/remarks/139119.htm
(last visited May 14, 2012) (emphasis in original); see also Ari Shapiro, U.S. Drone Strikes
Are Justified, Legal Adviser Says, NAT'L PUB. RADIO, Mar. 26, 2010,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=125206000.
10 See Al Qaeda's Anwar al-Awlaki Killed in Yemen, CBS NEWS, Sept. 30, 2011,
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-20113732.html.
11 Peter Finn & Greg Miller, Anwar al-Awlaki's Family Speaks Out Against His Son's
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outspoken critics of the Bush administration's use of torture. All of these
factors gained Obama support, and international law experts, human rights
advocates, governments, and international organizations around the world were
plainly reluctant to acknowledge the grave violations of international law being
committed by the administration. There was a good deal of disbelief that
Obama was not only following Bush's policy of targeted killing but expanding
it. There seems to have been cognitive dissonance by many who protested,
criticized, and brought legal action against Bush when it came to targeted
killings by Obama.
The statistics, however, starkly reveal Obama's far worse record on
targeted killing with drones compared with his predecessor. The United States
has used drones for kinetic (lethal) operations in six countries to date:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan, Somalia, and Libya, in chronological
order of initial drone use for targeted killing. 12 In three of those countries, the
United States has used drones as part of armed conflict hostilities: Afghanistan,
Iraq, and Libya. 13 In the three others, the United States has not been involved
in hostilities and has had no legal basis for attacking in those countries under
the law on resort to force (jus ad bellum).
Yemen was the first country where the United States resorted to the use
of drones without basis in the jus ad bellum. It began in 2002. By early 2012,
the United States had killed about 200 people with the attacks, apparently
increasing even while Yemen tried to hold elections to replace the long-time
dictator, Saleh, who had cooperated with U.S. targeted killing on his
territory. 14
The United States has also carried out targeted killing operations in
Somalia since at least late 2006 when Ethiopia invaded Somalia in an attempt
to depose Somalia's de facto government, the Islamic Courts. While that
military action was occurring, members of the U.S. military, using helicopter
gunships, pursued fleeing terrorism suspects, killing them from the air. The
United States has continued to carry out targeted killing operations in Somalia
ever since. The operations have for some years also included drone attacks
carried out by the CIA. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism published
figures in early 2012 of between forty-six and 162 persons killed between 2007
and 2012.5
12 For a detailed history of U.S. killing with drones, see Mary Ellen O'Connell, Seductive
Drones, Learning from a Decade ofLethal Operations, 21 J. L., INFO. & SCL 1 (2011),
available at http://www.jlisjournal.org/abstracts/oconnell.21.2.html.
13 See Paul Starobin, A Moral Flip-Flop? Defining a War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2011, at
SR5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/opinion/sunday/harold-kohs-flip-flop-
on-the-libya-question.html?pagewanted all.
14 See Covert War on Terror-the Data, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM,
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drone-data (last visited May 14,
2012).
15 See Chris Woods, Militants and Civilians Killed in Multiple US Somalia Strikes,
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The facts surrounding targeted killing in Pakistan are the best known.
The United States has used drones to carry out targeted killing in Pakistan
since 2004. Targeted killing operations by the CIA in Pakistan using methods
other than drones also appear likely from what was learned during the
Raymond Davis affair. 16 However, reliable numbers of persons killed through
targeted killing have only been publicly available respecting drone operations.
The Bureau of Investigative Journalism reported that as of early May 2012
between 2440 and 3113 persons killed.17
Is all of this killing in any way warranted? In a word: no. Targeted
killing beyond zones of armed conflict hostilities, what U.S. government
officials are now calling "hot battlefields," does not comport with international
law, with fundamental morality, or with what works in counterterrorism.
Others at the symposium have discussed counterterrorism policy. The
remainder of this article will address the relevant international law and, more
briefly, the morality of the targeted killing of terrorism suspects.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TARGETED KILLING OF TERRORISM
SUSPECTS
Five separate legal arguments are discernible in the Obama
administration's attempts to justify targeted killing. They are seen in
Brennan's Harvard speech, the speeches of several other officials, comments in
the press, and by observing U.S. practice of targeted killing.
1. The United States remains in a global "armed conflict
against al Qaida, the Taliban, and associated forces" that
began on 9/11.
2. Drone attacks are an exercise of the U.S.'s "inherent right
of self-defense" against an imminent threat.
3. Drone attacks are lawful counter-terrorism measures in
states that are "unable or unwilling" to counter terrorism.
4. Pakistan and Yemen have consented to attacks.
5. The attacks are precise.
In addition to these five, two other arguments have been made by
officials and commentators from time to time:
16 For the details of the Raymond Davis affair, see Scott Horton, Spy Games I, What is
Really at Stake in the Raymond Davis Case, FOREIGN AFF., Mar. 11, 2011, available at
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/11 /spygames?print-yes&hidecomments-yes
&page-full.
17 Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Covert War on Terror,
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones-data. (last visited May 26,
2012); see also, 2011: Drone Attacks Remained Ineffective Against Militant Leaders,
CONFLICT MONITORING CENTER, http://cmcpk.wordpress.com/2012/01/09/2011-drone-attacks-
remained-ineffective-against-militant-leaders/ (last visited May 15, 2012).
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6. Targeted killing is lawful when the victim is directly
participating in the hostilities in Afghanistan, regardless of
where the victim is.
7. In the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, drone attacks in
Pakistan are part of the Afghanistan counter-insurgency
war.
These arguments were not included in Brennan's Harvard speech, which may
be because they do not apply to Yemen and Somalia. Moreover, once the
United States withdraws from participation in combat in Afghanistan, they will
not apply anywhere.
As for the remaining arguments, the starting place for analysis is the
right to life. The justification for any intentional taking of life is found in
exceptions to the basic right. The justifications are narrow. In current
international law, the right to life is affirmed in all human rights treaties,
including most importantly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights:
Article 6: Every human being has the inherent right to life. This
right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his right to life."
The law governing when human life may be intentionally ended, when the
limitation on "arbitrary" deprivation is avoided, falls into two categories:
peacetime rules and rules within the law of armed conflict. In peace, a state
may only take a human life when "absolutely necessary in the defense of
persons from unlawful violence." 19 The United Nations Basic Principles for
the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (UN Basic
Principles), which are widely adopted by police throughout the world, provide
in Article 9:
Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons
except in self-defense or defense of others against the imminent
threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of a
particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest
a person presenting such a danger and resisting their authority,
or to prevent his or her escape, and only when less extreme
means are insufficient to achieve these objectives. In any event,
18 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 1.L.M. 368,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
19 McCann & Others v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 97 (ser. A) (1995); see also
Montero-Aranguren et al. (Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 150, 69 (July 5, 2006).
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intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when
strictly unavoidable in order to protect life. 20
To get away from these restrictions, the Bush administration argued within
days of the 9/11 attacks that the country was in a "global war on terror," that
allowed the killing or detention of suspected members of al-Qaeda, the Taliban
and other militant non-state actor groups wherever found in the world.
President Obama was highly critical of the "global war" paradigm as
asserting a right to limitless war in time and space. Upon taking office,
however, his legal and policy advisers have altered the policy in ways that
actually weaken their claim of right. State Department Legal Adviser, Dean
Harold Koh, argued in 2010, that "U. S. targeting practices . . . comply with all
applicable law, including the laws of war"21 and that "as a matter of
international law, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as
well as the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11
attacks, and may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense
under international law."22
Koh's statement implicates the first two of the five Obama arguments
listed above: global war and inherent self-defense. Koh has insisted to the
author that the Obama administration is not using the global war justification
of the Bush administration. In his view, the "armed conflict against al Qaeda"
and other groups is a distinctive legal argument to justify targeted killing.23
With all due respect, the difference between the two constructs is
imperceptible. While it may seem to be an improvement to wage war against
people rather than a concept like terrorism that will never end, terrorist groups
will never come to an end either. Moreover, Koh made it clear that it is not
really a war against terrorists based on finding war anywhere terrorist suspects
are found. Rather, it is a claimed right to use military force in states
experiencing instability. The president apparently will not be authorizing
drone strikes in the United Kingdom, Germany, or the United States. Thus, the
legal justification is not based on persons being fighters in an armed conflict; it
is based on persons being present in states with weak governments. Even if
this made any sense from a policy perspective, there is no international legal
right to exercise military force on this basis.
Moreover, presidents and legal advisers do not have the authority to
posit what is and is not an armed conflict. "Armed conflict" is an important
term in international law. The exceptions to the human right to life-when a
20 United Nations Basic Principles, Eighth U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and
the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, Aug. 27-Sept. 7, 1990, available at
http://www2ohchr.org/english/law/firearms.htm.
21 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, State. Dept., The Obama Administration and
International Law, Annual Meeting the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25,
2010), at 10, available at http://www.state.gov/s/1/releases/remarks/139119.htm (emphasis in
the original).
22 Id.
23 See Koh, supra note 9.
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killing is not an arbitrary deprivation of life-differ depending on whether
authorized persons are acting during an armed conflict or outside of armed
conflict. International humanitarian law is applicable in situations of armed
conflict and occupation.24 Certain states have accepted the obligation to grant
asylum to persons fleeing "armed conflict." 25 International law defines what
an armed conflict is for these and other important areas of international law.
The definition was not well known but has now been thoroughly researched in
a report of the International Law Association's Committee on the Use of
Force.26 The Committee consisted of eighteen scholars from fifteen countries
in five regions of the world.27  The scholars included some of the foremost
experts on international law and the use of force, human rights, and
international humanitarian law, including Jutta Brunn6e, Judith Gardam, James
Thuo Gathii, Christine Gray, Georg Nolte, and Sir Michael Wood. 28 The
Committee looked at a variety of evidence of the definition, including the
practice of states with respect to over 300 situations of violence since the
Second World War.29 The international community generally recognizes a
situation as one of armed conflict if there is, at a minimum, two or more
organized armed groups engaged in fighting of some intensity.30 Since 9/11,
the United States has been engaged in armed conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq,31
and Libya.32  It has carried out targeted killing in Pakistan, Somalia, and
Yemen, separate from any armed conflict hostilities. 33
24 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states that all UN member States must refrain "from the
threat or use of force . . . in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations." U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (emphasis added). One of the purposes of the UN is to
"achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of [a] ... humanitarian
character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights ... for all ..... Id. at
art. 1, para. 3. Taken together, these articles of the UN Charter carve out an exception for the
use of force in humanitarian interventions.
25 See Council of Europe Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004, Official Journal of the
European Union L 304; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (111)
A, art. 14, 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(111) (Dec. 10, 1948) ("Everyone has the right to seek and
to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.").
2 6 See USE OF FORCE COMM., INT'L LAW Ass'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE MEANING OF
ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (2010), available at http://www.ila-
hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1022. For armed conflict to exist, organized armed




31 Id. at 26.
32 See Starobin, supra note 13.
The United States might have been involved in an armed conflict in Pakistan, when it
assisted government forces in the suppression of an armed secessionist struggle in Buner
Province. This action lasted for a matter of weeks and is not related to U.S. targeted killing
practice. Some might argue that U.S. targeted killing is an unlawful resort to military force
comparable to the invasion of Iraq and that, as in Iraq, once the attacks are occurring, there is
an armed conflict. Targeted killing involves intermittent attacks, however, not fighting. There
has not been, to date, engagement with the United States. The attacks are examples of
298
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The second part of Koh's statement, that the United States is exercising
its inherent right of self-defense, is as weak as the first part respecting
worldwide armed conflict. Indeed, the second part contradicts the first part in
that the first part attempts to justify killing persons as part of an on-going
armed conflict that began on 9/11. If the United States is already in an armed
conflict justified as a lawful exercise of self-defense, then there is no need to
reference self-defense every time a military operation in that armed conflict is
carried out. The United States does not do this with respect to every operation
in Afghanistan, so why do so respecting Yemen, Pakistan, or Somalia in the
worldwide armed conflict against al-Qaeda, et al.? It appears, therefore, that
self-defense is being invoked as a makeweight for the patently inadequate
assertion that the United States is involved in World War III against al-Qaeda
and persons alleged to be associated with al-Qaeda.
In fact, the self-defense argument cannot add weight to the fiction of a
global war. Self-defense is only another inadequate argument. The legal right
of self-defense is codified in Article 51 of the UN Charter.3 4  Article 51
permits the exercise of individual or collective self-defense, which means
carrying out major military force on the territory of another state, if an armed
attack occurs.35 The victim state and those states joining it may use military
force in collective self-defense until the Security Council takes "measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security." 36 The International
Court of Justice (ICJ) has found that the right of self-defense may only be
exercised against a significant attack and must be aimed at a state responsible
for the armed attack.37 Attacking non-state actor groups on the territory of a
state is attacking the state as much as the group. Every use of force in self-
excessive use of force, which counts of force that violates the jus ad bellum. Such force has
been condemned in 2011 when carried out by the governments of Syria and Libya.
3 U.N. Charter art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any




3 See Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Choice qfLaw Against Terrorism, 4 J. NAT'L SEC. L. &
POL'Y 343, 359 (2010) (citing Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 1.C.J. 244 (Dec. 15);
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14
(June 27); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]; Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov.
6) 61-64; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 1.C.J. 136, 207, 33-34 (July 9) (separate opinion of Judge
Higgins); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005
1.C.J. 168, 222, 268, 146, 301 (Dec. 19); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43,
391 (Feb. 26)).
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defense must be necessary for the purpose of defense and proportional in terms
of the cost in human lives lost and property (including the environment)
destroyed.38 The principles of attribution, necessity, and proportionality are
not referred to expressly in Article 51 but are referred to indirectly. The ICJ
has explained in a number of cases that the reference to the "inherent right" of
self-defense is a reference to the additional customary international law
principles that are part of the right of self-defense. The ICJ held in the Nuclear
Weapons case that "there is a 'specific rule whereby self-defense would
warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and
necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in customary international
law."' This dual condition applies equally to Article 51 of the Charter,
whatever the means of force employed." 39
After 9/11, the United Kingdom made a case for the right of self-
defense against Afghanistan. 40 The UK presented in a white paper evidence of
Afghanistan's state responsibility for al-Qaeda's attacks in the United States on
9/11.41 Based on this evidence, resorting to the use of major military force
against Afghanistan, at least until the Taliban were driven from power, and
could be defended as necessary and proportional under international law.42
Compare this case for using force under Article 51 of the UN Charter in
Afghanistan with the attempts to justify using force under Article 51 in
Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. The United States has not suffered a
significant armed attack from these states, let alone an attack for which any of
these states is responsible. The government of Yemen has not invited the
United States to be part of its attempt to suppress secessionists in the north and
south of the country. Somalia barely has a government, 43 and Pakistan has
only invited the United States to help with the suppression of a secessionist
movement in Buner Province, a request that ended several years ago.44 Article
51 provides virtually no support for the targeted killings by the United States.
Further, Article 51 does not permit the use of force in self-defense to
pre-empt a future attack. The ICJ has not ruled on anticipatory self-defense,
but by requiring a significant attack, the evidence that the attack is significant
38 See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 94, 176 (noting the requirements of necessity and
proportionality when using self-defense).
Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 245, 41 (citing Nicaragua, 1986 1.C.J. at 94, 176); see
also Oil Platforms 2003 1.C.J. at 198.
40 See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism, 63 U. PITT. L. REv. 889,
901-02 (2002).
41 See id.
42 From the time President Karzai assumed governmental authority in Afghanistan, the
United States and its allies have been fighting a counterinsurgency war-not a war of self-
defense-as is evident by the war aims that consist of building up Afghanistan security forces
and institutions to be able to resist attempts at overthrow by the Taliban or other insurgent
groups.
43 See Somalia, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm (last
visited May 20, 2012) (describing the transitional government in Somalia).
44 See O'Connell, supra note 37, at 363 (citations omitted) (discussing the possibility of
U.S. drone attacks on behalf of Pakistan in Buner Province).
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must be of an actual attack that is at least underway if not completed. In the
case of attacks on Israel from the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the ICJ
determined in the Wall case that Israel is the responsible state for the territories
as the occupying power.45 Article 51 is not the relevant rule in a zone of
occupation. The ICJ has also found that the attacks by non-state actor militant
groups crossing the border from Congo into Uganda did not give rise to
Uganda's right to attack Congo.46 The ICJ stated expressly in Congo v.
Uganda that it was not reaching the case of "large-scale attacks" on Uganda.47
Such attacks, indeed, would have constituted a different case, one where,
presumably, the militant group controlled territory as a de facto government or
had close ties to the government to be able to launch such attacks and to create
a situation where major military counterattacks on the territory met the
principles of necessity and proportionality. Such factors would create a
situation like the Taliban's control of most of Afghanistan in 2001 or the
Kurds' control of northern Iraq.48 The United States has not declared that it is
attacking groups in control of territory as its basis for its claim of self-defense.
With respect to using force against a state unable or unwilling to use
force to control terrorist activity on its territory, international law contains no
rule justifying the use of force on this basis. Brennan asserted this argument as
a basis for the right to resort to military force; however, he cites no authority. 49
In this author's research, the phrase "unable or unwilling" appears to have
surfaced in connection with justifying resort to military force against foreign
sovereign states in the document titled "The Chatham House Principles of
International Law on the Use of Force in Self-Defence."50 The document was
sponsored by the foreign affairs think tank Chatham House (the Royal Institute
of International Affairs).51  The reference to resort to force against states
"unable or unwilling" to control terrorism on their territory has no citation to
authority in international law. Apparently the Principles include the "unable
and unwilling" basis because the drafters of the Principles understood this to
be a basis for resort to force that states want, rather than a basis that currently
exists in international law.52 It is, therefore, a proposal for a future rule but one
that contradicts the UN Charter.
45 See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 1.C.J. 136, 197, 201-02, 150, 163 (July 9).
46 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005
1.C.J. 168, 222, 268, 146, 301 (Dec. 19).
47 Id at 223, 147.
48 See id. at 222, 268, 146, 301. See also James Thuo Gathii, Irregular Forces and Self-
Defense Under the UN Charter, in WHAT IS WAR? AN INVESTIGATION IN THE WAKE OF 9/11,
91-102 (Mary Ellen O'Connell ed., Leiden: Martinus Nijhof2012).
49 See Brennan, supra note 1.
50 Elizabeth Wilmshurst, The Chatham House Principles of International Law on the Use
of Force in Self-Defence, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 963, 969-70 (2006).
511d. at 963. The author also incorporated comments made to her by Wilmshurst into this
article.
52 See id. at 969-70.
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Consent of Pakistan or Yemen is the fourth assertion that is often
joined to one or more of the others. Because Somalia has not had a
government that could give consent, the claim has no bearing for attacks there.
Most of the world now knows that authorities in Pakistan or Yemen have
given, at best, only erratic consent. Moreover, it is unclear to the author
whether Pakistan or Yemen may permissibly give consent for the use of
military force against terrorist suspects on their territory. Such consent would
a form of excessive force-the same wrongdoing for which governments
across the Arab world have been strongly criticized. It is unlawful to use
military force outside the context of armed conflict and self-defense.53
President Obama was asked in January about the wisdom of attacking
people with drones during a virtual interview organized by Google and
YouTube. Here is a description of what he said:
Obama then said he wanted to make sure people understood
drones have not caused a huge number of casualties. The
government has only been using "precise" strikes against al
Qaeda and their affiliates. He said there's a "perception" that the
US is engaging in a bunch of strikes "willy nilly" when what is
happening is a "targeted effort" to get people on a list, who want
to hit Americans and American facilities.54
It is true that the more precise a weapon is, the closer it will come to meeting
the requirement to distinguish between military targets and non-military ones.
Most people are aware that this principle of distinction is fundamental to the
law of armed conflict. It likely sounds reassuring to audiences when U.S.
officials point out that drones allow greater "precision." The problem is that
precision has little to do with the law on resort to force. The way drones are
used is governed by international humanitarian law or the law of armed
conflict-the law in war-not the law on the right to resort to military force in
the first place.
In addition to claims respecting armed conflict, self-defense, rights to
attack weak states, and precision munitions, when attacks are made in Pakistan
near the Afghanistan border, U.S. officials have also said that the purpose of
the attacks is to stop fighters who have crossed into Afghanistan to fight on
55behalf of the insurgency. Other commentators will hypothesize that someone
5 See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, The International Legality qf US Military Cross-Border
Operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan, 85 INT'L L. STUD. 109, 118-20 (2009). Murphy
discusses consent at length and raises concerns about it as a solid basis for the US use of force
in Pakistan. He fails, however, to begin by assessing that to which Pakistan has the legal right
to consent.
54 Kevin Gosztola, In YouTube Event, Obama Defends Government's Use QfDrones, THE
DISSENTER, Jan. 30, 2012, http://dissenter.firedoglake.com/2012/01/30/president-obama-says-
us-must-be-judicious-in-drone-use/
5 See, e.g., INT'L SEC. ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF), KEY FACTS AND FIGURES (2012),
available at http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf. ISAF, "as mandated by the
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physically distant from the Afghanistan hostilities might, nevertheless, be
directly participating in them. These particular claims are not part of the
Brennan or Koh analysis perhaps because they will only apply so long as the
U.S. is participating in hostilities in Afghanistan. In addition, the first
argument is applicable only to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. As
such, it underscores that no similar fighting involving the United States is
occurring in Somalia or Yemen. Yet, the justification is used regularly and
merits consideration here. There are several problems with it. Chief among
the problems is that the United States and other international forces are
56fighting a counterinsurgency armed conflict in Afghanistan. It is being
fought to give Hamid Karzai and security forces loyal to him control of
Afghanistan. 7 This means that fighting beyond Afghanistan must be
justifiable for this military objective and have the Karzai government's
consent. If there are attacks on Afghanistan from Pakistan, it must be for
Afghanistan to decide whether to counterattack. Doing so must follow the
same rules respecting self-defense discussed above: There must be significant
armed attacks, for which the territorial state is responsible, and the response
with major military force on the territory of Pakistan must be necessary and
proportional to accomplish the military objective. At the time of writing this
article, none of these conditions appears to be present. In response to a series
of armed incidents by the United States against Pakistan, the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border is closed to truck traffic re-supplying international forces
in Afghanistan. The military objective of ending the insurgency in
Afghanistan has been harmed rather than helped by targeted killing in the
border region.
As for remote participation, the justification would only apply if the
United States had highly precise information about the activity of a targeted
person at the time of the killing. If the United States ever had such
information, it would be in a rare case. Even then, the International Committee
of the Red Cross's Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation makes clear
that whether a person could be targeted and killed when far from actual
United Nations Security Council, is working to create the conditions whereby the Government
of Afghanistan is able to exercise its authority throughout the country."
56 Tarek El-Tablawy, Hamid Karzai: Afghanistan Would Back Pakistan in U.S. War,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 23, 2011, 1:39 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/23/hamid-karzai-afghanistan-
pakistan n_1027115.html (mentioning a U.S.-led coalition joining with Afghan forces to
disrupt insurgent operations in Kabul, Afghanistan).
57 ISAF, supra note 55 (outlining ISAF's key priorities in Afghanistan, which include
"build[ing] the capacity of the Afghan Security Forces so they can take lead responsibility for
security in their own country").
58 Tom Wright & Adam Entous, Coordination Is Questioned in Wake ofNA TO Airstrike,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 29, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204753404577066120988157782.html.
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fighting would governed by the appropriate necessity standard. s9 Far from
armed conflict hostilities, the necessity standard would be absolute necessity,
which is the law enforcement standard, not the battlefield's reasonable
necessity standard.60
CONCLUSION
Many Americans, upon learning of these international legal rules
restraining resort to military force in the counterterrorism context, express the
view that international law is too restrictive. A wide swath of the American
public has come to believe that military force is the appropriate or available
response to terrorism-at least outside the United States itself. In fact, the
ready use of military force is at the root of many of the United States' most
serious challenges today, such as the government deficit, which will grow
astronomically as the costs of caring for tens of thousands of injured
servicemen and servicewomen continues for decades to come. With respect to
the topic of this article, U.S. targeted killing, especially with drones, is
undermining trust, cooperation, and the rule of law in the very places where
those factors are essential. As a major in the U.S. Army JAG Corps described
it in April 2012:
The masses of Americans have been persuaded by more than a
decade of bellicose, Orwellian propaganda that only the constant
use of military force can bring security and peace to America...
. [A]dvocacy of security through adherence to the law-though
reasonable, ethical, and utterly defensible-is at stark contrast to
the ends-oriented, insular worldview embraced by an
increasingly conservative American populace. . . . As a nation
we raced to the bottom after 9/11 and embraced every
justification and pretence to exact our revenge. I wonder if we
will ever find our way back.61
The United States has been at such legal and moral dead ends before, most
memorably during the Vietnam War. The country did find its way back and
could again through a renewed commitment, as Brennan has said, to American
values and the rule of law.
5 International Committee of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of
Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (2009)[hereinafter
Interpretative Guidance]. The Guidance does not discuss the right to detain.
60 Id. at 80-81; see also, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, UN Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, at 3 (28 May 2010).
61 Private e-mail from a Major in the U.S. Army JAG Corps to Mary Ellen O'Connell
(April 10, 2012) (on file with author).
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